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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to estimate the impacts of medium- and long-term
participation in microcredit programs. It utilises a new and large panel dataset
collected from treatment and control households from 1997 to 2005. The data
enables us to identify continuing participants in the program as well as newcomers
and leavers. We employ di⁄erent estimation strategies including triple-di⁄erence
and propensity score matching methods to control for selection bias. The impact
estimates indicate that the bene￿ts from microcredit vary more than proportionately
with the duration of participation in a program. Larger bene￿ts are realized from
longer-term participation, and that the bene￿ts continue to accrue beyond departure
from the program. The ￿ndings indicate the need to observe longer periods of
participation to provide a reliable basis for assessing the e⁄ectiveness of microcredit
lending.
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11 Introduction
Over the past two decades microcredit has become an important tool for rural poverty
reduction. A substantial proportion of low-income rural families from many developing
countries are now served by microcredit institutions (MCIs). Coverage is particularly
impressive in Bangladesh, where microcredit reached more than 60 percent of its poor by
2005 (World Bank 2007). At present, there are a large number of microcredit schemes in
operation around the world, and each year international donors, lending agencies and na-
tional governments allocate tens of billions of dollars for microcredit programs. However,
there is currently no evidence about the medium- and long-term bene￿ts of participating
in such programs, probably due to the di¢ culty in obtaining data. So far, the evaluation
of microcredit has concentrated on short-term impacts, and these are mostly based on
cross-sectional data. The worldwide scale of micro￿nance1, and the importance it has
been given by donor agencies and international organizations2, indicates that evaluating
impacts over a longer-term horizon can be very useful for program design, the targeting
of aid, and poverty reduction.
The returns from microcredit, which is mainly used for self-employment activities, are
likely to vary with the length of participation. For example, Banerjee, Du￿ o, Glenner-
ster and Kinnan (2009) argue that impact estimates from short-term evaluation might be
completely di⁄erent from those of long-term participation. In the short term, according
to them, it is possible that some households cut back on consumption to enable greater
investment that might make them signi￿cantly richer and increase consumption in the
long run. This paper reports, for the ￿rst time, the sensitivity of the impact of the micro-
credit program with respect to the length of participation in a program. The objective
is to distinguish the short-term participation e⁄ects from the medium- and long-term
participation e⁄ects. Many households may not obtain the potential return until they
invest su¢ cient sums of money. Typically, it takes a member several years to establish a
trustworthy reputation that is required to obtain larger loans. Di⁄erent investments will
1Micro￿nance is wider in scope compared to microcredit, however, we use the two terms interchange-
ably in this paper.
2The United Nations declared 2005 as the International Year of Microcredit. The 2006 Nobel Peace
Prize winner was Professor Yunus and the Grameen Bank. World Bank (WB) Groups have a substantial
investment in micro￿nance, and according to their website it will raise investment in micro￿nance to $1.2
billion by 2010.
2have di⁄erent time horizons in their returns￿pro￿le. Therefore, ￿ndings of the short-term
evaluations may not provide reliable assessment of the overall impact of the microcredit
program.
Evaluating microcredit programs based on data over a long period of participation
could improve our understanding of the contribution that microcredit programs may make
to the development process. However, this requires researchers to observe treatment and
control households over a signi￿cant period of time. Recent availability of eight-year
monitoring and follow-up of microcredit program data o⁄ers an opportunity to examine
important questions about longer-term participation. This paper uses four waves of a
panel dataset of treatment and control groups of large-scale microcredit programs in
Bangladesh. The survey encompasses about 3,000 households from 91 villages from 1997
to 2005.
Most development practitioners and policy makers believe that microcredit can help
the poor to break out of poverty. However, we don￿ t know whether microcredit actually
reduces poverty. The ￿ndings from the existing impact evaluation studies indicate that the
e⁄ects microcredit vary from place to place, and also depend on the particular settings and
design of the program. Pitt and Khandker (1998), using instrumental variable method,
￿nd that microcredit signi￿cantly increases consumption expenditure, reduces poverty,
and increases non-land assets. Morduch (1998), using the same dataset but applying a
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach, ￿nds that microcredit has insigni￿cant or even negative
e⁄ects on the same measures of outcomes. Khandker (2005) ￿nds more muted results than
Pitt and Khandker (1998). Islam (2008) ￿nds microcredit helps to increase consumption
only for the relatively poor. In Thailand, Coleman (1999) ￿nds that average program
impact on assets, savings, expenditure on education and health care is insigni￿cant. On
the other hand, Kaboski and Townsend (2005) ￿nd that membership in certain types of
institutions can have a positive impact on asset growth and consumption in Thailand. In
their 2009 study they examine a village fund where the Thai government delivers a ￿xed
amount of money to a village regardless of the number of individuals in the village. They
report increased consumption, agricultural investment, income growth, but decreased
overall asset growth.
Karlan and Zinman (2010) examine the impact of expanding access to consumer credit
3in South Africa. They use individual randomization of marginal clients and the results
from surveys following 6-12 months of the experiment indicate signi￿cant and positive
e⁄ects on income and food consumption. Using a similar experimental design, Karlan
and Zinman (2009) ￿nd stronger treatment e⁄ects of credit borrowed by male and higher-
income entrepreneurs. Their results also suggest some evidence of a decline in well-being
for some group of borrowers. Banerjee et al. (2009) report results of a randomized eval-
uation 15 to 18 months after the introduction of the program in the slums of Hyderabad
in India. They ￿nd signi￿cant positive impact on new business start-up, pro￿tability of
existing business and purchase of business durables, but ￿nd no e⁄ect on average con-
sumption, health and education expenditure. The microcredit programs we study here
are very much similar to those studied by Banerjee et. al. (2009).
Unlike Banerjee et. al. (2009) our data does not come from randomized experiment.
However, the availability of panel data enables us to address the concern regarding the
selection bias using less restricitive assumptions than that of non-experimental cross-
sectional program evaluation. We consider a variety of approaches to identify the di⁄erent
treatment e⁄ects, and to check the robustness of the results. At ￿rst, we employ the
household ￿xed e⁄ects (FE) model. We then combine the FE and the propensity score
matching (PSM) method that account for time-invariant unobservables and minimize
the di⁄erences in the distribution between treated and non-treated households. In order
to allow for time-varying unobserved household-speci￿c di⁄erences, we use the random
growth model (see Heckman and Hotz 1989), and also combine this method with the PSM
method. However, if there are shocks or changes speci￿c to treatment villages that have
nothing to do with the program then the FE-PSM estimate will still be biased. Therefore,
we use triple-di⁄erence (DDD) matching and regression methods.3
Our data indicate that some microcredit member (treatment group) dropped out from
the program, and some non-treated (control households) joined. Therefore, if we treat ini-
3Microcredit in Bangladesh is typically targeted at households who are eligible, although this is not
strictly enforced. There are both eligible and non-eligible households in treatment and control villages.
Therefore, we can estimate the impact of micro￿nance on those targeted (eligible households) by using
triple-di⁄erence: the di⁄erence between double-di⁄erence estimates for eligible and ineligible households
(with both these groups being matched based on their observed characteristics). The use of land-based
eligibility criterion is subject to debate in the context of microcredit in Bangladesh, and we address this
issue in Section 4. Unlike previous studies (e.g., Pitt and Khandker 1998) we use a di⁄erent cut-o⁄ point
for eligibilty based on household surveys.
4tial participating and conparison groups as treated and non-treated, the treatment/control
di⁄erential is likely to be underestimated. The dataset contains information regarding the
participation status of households for each year during the survey period. Thus, we are
able to identify di⁄erent treatment groups such as latecomers (newcomers) and households
who continued their participation for at least eight years (stayers). Because entry into
the program and the timing of the particpation are not random, we compare the changes
in outcome before and after (at least two years￿ ) participation in the program. We es-
timate the treatment e⁄ect depending on the length of exposure to the program. There
are also households who departed from the program. We track these drop-outs for up to
eight years following their exit from the program. Using these households (￿leavers￿ ), we
examine if the bene￿ts received by participants continue after leaving the program. We
are thus able to estimate the lasting impact of participation in the program. This could
help us to understand what might happen when a member leaves the program.
We obtain the impact estimates of long-term participation based on at least eight
years of continuing participation in a program. Estimates obtained for newcomers are
interpreted as short-or medium-term impacts, depending on the length of their exposure
to the programs. We also estimate medium or long-run impacts using a sub-sample of
leavers.4 We look at the impact on changes in self-employment income, other income,
food and non-food expenditure and assets. The main ￿nding of this paper is that the
gains from microcredit programs vary with the duration of participation. The results show
that the larger bene￿ts accrue from longer-term participation. They also indicate that
bene￿ts may continue after the end of participation in a program but that such bene￿ts
are likely to be short-lived. The empirical results suggest that extrapolation using short-
term participation data in the microcredit program may yield biased conclusions regarding
the overall impact of the program. The ￿ndings from this study could provide a way to
understand the impact of di⁄erent lengths of participation in microcredit, and present a
tentative time path of graduation from poverty. Our approach to estimate the impacts of
di⁄erent lengths of program participation appears to be a signi￿cant contribution to the
literature, as it rests on observation rather than extrapolation.
4We use the words run and term to distinguish between impact estimates of leavers and existing
clients of microcredit, respectively.
52 The Survey and the Data
This paper uses data from the surveys conducted by the Bangladesh Institute of De-
velopment Studies (BIDS) and the Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF, Rural Em-
ployment Support Foundation) for the purposes of monitoring and evaluating microcredit
programs in Bangladesh. The ￿rst survey was administered after a census of all house-
holds in the 91 villages during October 1997. The survey encompasses 23 sub-districts
of 13 of Bangladesh￿ s 64 districts. One aim of the survey was to capture a representa-
tive sample of microcredit households that re￿ ects the overall operation of microcredit in
Bangladesh. The treated households were drawn from 13 di⁄erent sizes of MCIs (so as to
be representative of MCIs in Bangladesh), each from separate districts (out of 64 districts
of Bangladesh). All these MCI are members of PKSF.5 These MCIs have similar types of
program activities and provide loans in a similar way to the Grameen Bank. Most of the
clients in our sample are women, and credit is not o⁄ered to a mixed group of men and
women together. Of the 13 selected MCIs, two were deliberately chosen from the four
largest MCIs in Bangladesh. The survey was designed initially to have two control villages
(these villages do not have any microcredit program but otherwise similar to the program
villages in terms of geographical proximity and other village-level characteristics) and six
treatment villages from each of the areas where microcredit was operating. However,
since not enough control villages could be found in all areas, only 11 control villages were
included in the ￿rst round. Subsequent rounds of the survey revealed that some of the
control villages turned into program villages, and in the ￿nal round of survey there were
8 control villages.6 Because of the absence of an adequate number of control villages,
non-clients from the treatment villages who expressed their willingness to participate in
the program were also surveyed. They were selected based on observable characteristics
reported in the census. The household dataset is strati￿ed, and clustered at the village
level.
While four rounds of the survey were conducted (in 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000 and
2004-05), we mainly use data from the ￿rst, third and fourth round because the second
5PKSF, established in 1990, works as a regulatory organization for the MCIs. It mobilizes funds from
a wide variety of sources and provides these funds to its members for lending as microcredit.
6Khandker (2005) also highlights the di¢ culty of obtaining control villages.
6round did not collect comprehensive information on outcome variables such as consump-
tion and income.7 All surveys took place during December to April. The ￿rst and third
waves consisted of 3,026 and 2,939 households, respectively, and the ￿nal wave had 2,729
households from the same number of villages. The attrition rate over 1997-2005 was less
than 10 percent: about 1.2 percent per calendar year. We study a balanced panel of
2,694 households to compare outcomes over time (we delete 35 observations because of
missing data on some key variables). The survey has di⁄erent modules for household
socioeconomic condition, microcredit participation, village- and MCI-level information.
The household dataset has several strengths. The data is comprehensive and covers infor-
mation on all major socioeconomic conditions of households. There is detailed household
information on income (from di⁄erent sources and categories), possession, ownership, sales
and purchases of all assets, expenditure on food and non-food items, and so on. It also
records data on loan use, the amount borrowed, and the duration of the membership.
The descriptive statistics of key demographic variables of treatment and control groups
for di⁄erent survey rounds are given in the top panel of Table 1.
Observation units have not remained stable. Many of the clients dropped out of the
program after one or more years, and some of the control households became clients later.
However, drop-outs from the program and newcomers into the program were also inter-
viewed during each survey. Some splitting up of the original households also took place
due to demographic transition. We found that 116 households had split up during the
1999-2000 round of survey, while 184 households had split up by the 2004/05 survey. The
survey followed most of the members of split-up households who were also re-interviewed.
We merged the split-up households with the original one to form a single household. The
splitting up is not a major issue in this study, as there is very little migration outside of
the village.
7One reason to have a follow-up survey in 2004-05 after a gap of about 4 years was to obtain impact
estimates for those who dropped out and for those who participated for the ￿rst time. Therefore, an e⁄ort
was made to obtain detail information on participation status during this interval. We have year-to-year
information about household participation status for other years when there was no survey. The author
was also personally involved in the last wave of data collection and administration.
72.1 Attrition
Here we examine whether there is any attrition bias even though the attrition rate from
the survey is low compared to many other panel datasets from developing countries.
Attrition bias arises if the variables that a⁄ect the probability of attrition have a non-
zero correlation with the error term of an outcome equation with a sample that has
been reduced by attrition. The sample comparison of means of demographic and other
socioeconomic variables reveal that the attritors are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the
stayers. There are 147 attritors from treated households and 184 from control households
in all three waves. Thus, the attrition rate is higher among the non-clients. However, a
comparison of means of the attritors in terms of their demographic variables reveals no
signi￿cant di⁄erence between clients and non-clients (see Table 8). In results not reported
here we do not reject the hypothesis of the equality of the two distributions for any
demographic variable using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. In the spirit of Fitzgerald,
Gottschalk and Mo¢ t (1998) we also began with an explanation of the correlates of
attrition in our survey. We estimate a probit model of overall attrition, and attrition by
participation status in the ￿rst round using a lagged demographic variable for the current
round￿ s attrition. We also test the equality of the probit regression coe¢ cients for stayers
and for attritors. We did not ￿nd any signi￿cant di⁄erences in the covariates that have
a very strong correlation with future non-response. The full set of attrition results are
available from the author upon request.8 It is also possible that attrition is related shocks.
That is some households might have experienced negative shocks, which led to business
failure and exit from microcredit. Islam and Maitra (2009), using this dataset, ￿nd that
attrition rate is not in￿ eunced by household level health shcoks. Overall, the evidence is
that any selection bias from attrition is not a problem in the present study. Moreover,
we employ an estimation strategies which can resolve many potential biases (including
attrition bias) that are due to unobservables.9
8Studies that use longitudinal data from both developed (see Journal of Human Resources 1998 Spring
issue) and developing countries (Thomas, Frankenberg and Smith (2001) for IFLS data; Falaris (2003) for
LSMS data from Peru, Cote d￿ Ivoire and Vietnam) ￿nd that even if demographic variables for attritors
and stayers are di⁄erent, and there are selective mechanisms working for attrition, the e⁄ects of attrition
on parameter estimates are mild or non-existent.
9We also experiment with the most common approach of taking account of attrition bias in our
regression estimation. We give weight to each observation by the inverse of the probability of staying in
the sample, and carry out our estimation. The results are similar with or without weighting.
82.2 Outcomes of Interest and Descriptives
We are mainly interested in evaluating the impact on household income, consumption and
assets. Self-employment income is of particular interest to us since microcredit programs
are intended to enhance self-employment activities. Self-employment income is de￿ned
as the sum of the proceeds from all of the household￿ s self-employment activities minus
operating expenses (excluding the value of household￿ s own labor). We also estimate the
impact on ￿other income,￿much of which comes from some form of productive activity
(households may buy a cow for agricultural activity or as an investment). Total income
of a household would be equal to the "self-employment income" plus "other income".
Moreover, money is fungible and there is substitutability between capital: households
borrowing from MCI can transfer their own assets and savings to other activities, and
hence pave the way to invest in multiple and diversi￿ed projects. As a result, we compute
￿total income￿from a wide range of sources.
Since income may produce ￿noisy￿data, particularly in a developing country, we also
consider alternative measures to evaluate the bene￿ts from microcredit. Poor households
in Bangladesh spend a signi￿cant part of their income on food. We have information
about 200 commodities consumed for a given period prior to each round of survey. The
information covers a wide range and types (e.g. food purchased, home produced) of food
consumption, and is as good as the standard LSMS food consumption module. The non-
food expenditure data includes items such as kerosene, batteries, soap, housing repairs,
clothing, schooling and health expenditures, etc. The data for non-food consumption
expenditure was collected for di⁄erent recall periods, depending on how frequently the
items concerned are typically purchased. We construct non-food expenditure to a uniform
reference period of one year. Together with food expenditure, consumption expenditure
provides an alternative measure of household welfare. Finally, many households can save
in the form of durable and non-durable assets, and also many households buy assets (such
as livestock) using credit. Therefore, we measure the impact on total non-land assets of
households, also excluding the value of the house.
We de￿ ate the outcome variables by the rural household agricultural index, which is
set to 1997-98 = 100. To reduce the e⁄ect of a few outliers, we exclude those households
reporting unreasonably high or low values of the outcome variables (although this did
9not signi￿cantly a⁄ect the results). The lower panel of Table 1 reports the results of the
outcome variables by treatment status for di⁄erent years. It shows that food consumption
is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent between treatment and control groups, the two groups have
di⁄erent outcome in other measures. The table shows that total microcredit borrowed
by households are taka 7;427, 10;616, and 11;682 for 1997-98, 1999-2000 and 2004-05,
respectively.
3 The Baseline Empirical Strategy
There are two major concerns for evaluating the impacts of microcredit at the household
level. First, MCIs choose to provide credit in particular villages. For example, it could
be the case that poorer villages get priority for microcredit. Alternatively, the decision
to provide services might come about because of strong demand from a local community.
Second, households within the program villages self-select into the program. It is likely
that the decision to participate in a program is driven by households￿need for credit or
the perceived bene￿t from such credit. As a result, participation into the microcredit
program may not be orthogonal to unobservable factors that also a⁄ect the outcome of
interest. Thus impact evaluation of microcredit programs requires controlling for selec-
tion bias. The availability of panel data allows us to address the selection bias, and to
avoid restrictive assumptions that are common in a cross-sectional data. We also adopt
estimation methodologies which further relax many of the identifying assumptions that
are typical in panel data estimation.
At the outset, we consider the household ￿xed e⁄ects (FE) regression which ensures
that any variable that remains constant over time (but are unobserved) and is correlated
with the participation decision and the outcome variable will not bias the estimated e⁄ect.
We include controls so that the di⁄erences in age, household size, etc. are controlled. We
use the following FE linear regression model:
Yijlt = ￿i + ￿t + ￿Dit + ￿￿l + ￿Xit + Gj + "ijlt (1)
where Yijlt is the outcome of interest, e.g., consumption expenditure or income, for
household i living in village j in a microcredit area l at period t (expressed logarithmically
10except for the self-employment income). Dit is the treatment variable that takes on (i)
the amount of credit borrowed from a MCI at period t ; and (ii) the value of 1 if a
household receives treatment from a MCI in period t and 0 otherwise. Xit is a vector
of household-speci￿c control variables, Gj is village ￿xed e⁄ects which eliminates the
problem if programs were placed non-randomly, ￿i is ￿xed e⁄ects unique to household i,
￿t is a period e⁄ect common to all households in period t, ￿l is the MCI/district-level
￿xed e⁄ects. Household-level ￿xed e⁄ects method also resolve any village or any upper
(e.g., district) level unobserved heterogeneity (hence ￿l and Gj are redundant in equation
(1)) . The error term "ijlt is household￿ s transitory shock that has mean zero for each
period and is assumed to be distributed independently of the treatment status Dit.The
errors might be correlated across time and space. We therefore compute standard errors
clustered at the village-year level to allow for an arbitrary covariance structure within
villages over time.
Equation (1) is somewhat restrictive because it assumes that the selection bias is due
to (i) an unobserved household speci￿c component (￿i) that is ￿xed over time, or (ii)
observed di⁄erences between treatment and control groups that are due to X, and in
the absence of program participation ￿ = 0: However, di⁄erential unobserved trends of
treatment and control groups is a matter of concern here. In the following speci￿cation, we
assume that there is a household-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect and a household-speci￿c time trend.
The model, known as a random growth model (see Ashenfelter and Card 1985, Heckman
and Hotz 1989), takes the ￿xed e⁄ects model a step further by allowing unobserved
household di⁄erences that change at a ￿xed rate over time. We specify this model as:
Yijlt = ￿i + ￿it + ￿1CDit + ￿1Xitj + ￿ijlt (2)
where Yijlt is the natural log of the outcome of interest, CDit is the cumulative amount
of credit borrowed up until period t. The later is introduced to allow past loans to
have an e⁄ect on a household￿ s current consumption, income and assets. Thus, ￿i can
be interpreted as the average growth rate over a period (holding other covariates ￿xed).
Adding ￿it to the set of covariates also accounts for di⁄erential unobserved trends between
treatment and control groups.
We may eliminate household ￿xed e⁄ects by di⁄erencing the dependent variable. With
a simple modi￿cation, we express the ￿rst-di⁄erenced model in the following form:
11￿Yit = ￿i + ￿Dit + ￿Xit + ￿it (3)
where Dit is the net amount of credit borrowed from MCI at period t. This model
eliminates the selection bias that results from household-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects and the
household-speci￿c time trend. Thus, ￿rst di⁄erencing the cumulative credit variable
would yield the net amount of microcredit borrowed at period t. Since ￿rst di⁄erencing
the righthand side variable will mean losing more variables (if we estimate ￿xed e⁄ects on
di⁄erenced variables we eliminate many of our variables of interest (linear time trend vari-
able)) that a⁄ect the growth in outcomes, we use the level of variables such as education,
age, household size, etc. Equation (3) is then just the standard unobserved e⁄ects model.
This means we can apply ￿xed e⁄ects methods to estimate the treatment e⁄ect. In the
actual estimation strategy, we also incorporate village level time trend (3) to control for
village-level shocks.10
3.1 Results: Fixed E⁄ects and Random Growth Model
The ￿xed e⁄ect regression results using equation (1) are given in columns (1) and (2)
of Table 2. Since treatment assignment is not randomized, we also report results based
on the matching method. We match households from treated and non-treated groups
based on their observed characteristics. The details of the matching procedure are given
in the next section. The results indicate that microcredit can increase self-employment
income, consumption, and assets of households. The largest impact observed is on self-
employment income, and the lowest is on food consumption (when we consider matched
sample). Table 2 shows that treated households are able to increase food consumption by
1:9 percent, non-food consumption by 3 percent, and assets by 4:85 percent. The point
estimate for ￿other income￿is negative and insigni￿cant: only 0:77 percent. We use a
random-e⁄ect Tobit model (since a ￿xed-e⁄ect Tobit model is biased and inconsistent) to
estimate the treatment e⁄ect on self-employment income as there are zeros in many cases.
The coe¢ cient estimates indicate that household self-employment income increases by
14:7 taka by borrowing 100 taka from a MCI. The statistical signi￿cance of the results is
10An advantage of models such as equation (1-3) is that they are robust with choice-based sampling
which characterizes most non-experimental datasets, such as the dataset used in this study.
12not a⁄ected by the particular standard error (block bootstrapping or clustering by village-
year level) we consider. Therefore, we report results using clustering at the village-year
level.
Results for the random growth model (equation 3) are given in columns (3) and (4)
of Table 2. We ￿nd results similar to that of ￿xed e⁄ects estimation except in the case
of ￿other income.￿Column (4) indicates that non-food consumption has increased by 4:3
percent, and other income by 6:5 percent. The estimated increase in food consumption
and assets are 0:47 percent and 4:9 percent, respectively, for households in the treatment
group. The coe¢ cient estimates from the random-e⁄ect Tobit model indicate that a 100
taka increase in borrowing from a MCI will add 31:7 taka to household income. The
estimated coe¢ cients from random growth model are larger than that of ￿xed e⁄ects
model.
There are many clients of the microcredit we study here who dropped out later from
the program. It also appears from the data that some control group members joined the
program after the 1997-98 survey took place. As a result, some households received partial
treatment in view of the entire survey period. In the presence of partial treatment, the
estimator provides an estimate of assignment of the treatment rather than of the mean
impact of the treatment itself (Heckman, Smith and Taber 1998). It is likely that our
estimate is smaller than we would obtain in the absence of exit from the program or entry
into the program. Below we consider an approach that can identify the impact of partial
treatment separately from the impact of the full treatment on the fully treated.
4 Other Evaluation Strategies
4.1 Triple-di⁄erence Matching Estimate
Our identi￿cation strategy in the last section also assumes that there is no shock to
the outcomes of the treatment and control groups contemporaneously to the program.
That may be a strong identi￿cation assumption, and any pre-program level di⁄erence
between treatment and control groups may account for relative shifts in the outcome of
interest. Thus, we control for di⁄erent relative shocks a⁄ecting households in treatment
and control villages by using a triple-di⁄erence strategy. microcredit in Bangladesh is
13typically o⁄ered to households who are eligible11 in a program village12. Therefore, the
potentially una⁄ected ineligible households from treatment and control villages can be
used to di⁄erence away any relative trend in the treatment and control groups correlated
with unobserved variables, but not due to participation in the program. For comparability,
we include those ineligible households who are similar to that of eligible households in
terms of observable characteristics. Thus, we can use a method that involves using a DD
estimate for eligible and ineligible households.13 In essence, this entails a triple-di⁄erence:
a double-di⁄erence estimate for eligible households, minus a DD estimate for ineligible
households. Ineligible households are not a⁄ected by the program, and the programs do
not target them. In our sample about 17 percent of the participants are from the ineligible
group. We exclude them from our estimation. This triple-di⁄erence estimator allows us to
compare the e⁄ect of microcredit participation on eligible clients (in a treatment village)
relative to eligible non-clients from a control village. It also provides a cleaner way to
separate out some of the bias from the di⁄erential growth e⁄ects that may be caused by
gaps in initial characteristics.14
To alleviate concern regarding comparability of the treatment and control groups,
11The MCIs set the o¢ cial eligibility rule as households having less than 50 decimals (half an acre) of
land in order to target the poorer households. By that criterion, a large number of ineligible households
(30-40 percent, depending on the survey year) received the treatment. Discussions with local branch
managers and ￿eld level o¢ cials of MCIs indicate that they treat households holding marginally more
land with ￿ exibility (on the grounds that land quality and price are not the same in every region, lack
of perfect information about the borrowers￿ownership of land, etc). The last survey asked households
about the eligibility criterion, and many households reported that they are eligible if they hold less than
one acre of land. Therefore, we adopt the eligibility criterion of households having less than one acre of
land at the baseline (in 1997/98). According to this criterion, about 83 percent of the participants are
eligible.
12Microcredit lenders do not lend outside the village in which they operate.
13The di⁄erence in changes in outcomes of eligible households across treatment and control villages is the
DD estimate for eligible (treatment) group. Similarly, the di⁄erence in changes in outcomes of ineligible
households across treatment and control villages is the DD estimate for the ineligible (una⁄ected) group.
14The identifying assumption here is that there are no household-level shocks driving participation in
micro￿nance. Unfortuately, our data do not allow us to investigate if household takes loan to insure
against a negative income shock. Islam and Maitra (2009), using this dataset, examine the shocks, in
particular those related to health shocks, and do not ￿nd that shocks are systemtically di⁄erent between
treatment and control groups. In general, households cannot borrow from MCI against shocks. They
have to borrow against business proposal/existing business. Moreover, a household experiencing shock
cannot borrow unless she is already in a group or form a group. Thus shocks at the household level
cannot directly be insured from MCI. The MCIs we study here do not provide any explicit insurance
coverage for members to borrow against shocks. However, we do not completely rule out that possibility,
and thus our estimates would subject o bias to the extent households form new groups with others to
participate in microcredit when they are hit by shocks.
14we use a non-parametric matching strategy. In particular, we use the propensity score
matching (PSM) of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to clean out observable heterogeneity
prior to using the triple-di⁄erence estimator. Selection of variables for the propensity score
is a crucial step in the estimation of treatment e⁄ects. In identifying the set of control
variables to estimate propensity score we ￿rst consider the variables (e.g., household and
village characteristics) that the MCIs use to select a household and that are likely to
determine household demand for credit. We include all the variables that may a⁄ect both
participation and potential outcomes (see the Appendix for variables used in estimating
the propensity score). Using the ￿rst cross-section observation, we estimate a standard
logit model where dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if
a household is a client of a MCI and 0 otherwise. The empirical distribution of the
estimated odds-ratio of clients and non-clients shows that there are very few regions of
non-overlapping support (see Figure 1).
We impose a tolerance level on the maximum propensity score distance to improve
the quality of matching. We follow Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) and apply a variant
of caliper matching called radius matching. We use only as many comparison units as are
available within the caliper. This matching estimator automatically imposes the common
support condition and avoids the risk of bad matches. Therefore, households from the
untreated group are chosen as matching partners for treated households that lie within
the caliper. Observations closer to the treated group are given heavier weight. We use
the biweight kernel and weights are given to each observation by the following kernel
formula: K = 15=16(1 ￿ (di=b)2)2; where di is the distance from the control observation
to the treatment observation and b is the bandwidth (equal to 0:06). The weights are
then normalized to sum to one for each observation. The normalized weights are used to
create a comparison observation for each treatment observation.15
Thus, our strategy is to compare the observed outcome changes between eligible clients
and eligible non-clients, with these two groups matched based on their odds-ratio of
participating in a microcredit program. Since there may also be economy-wide changes
that have nothing to do with the program and may have di⁄erent implications for eligible
15We also experimented with an approach following Crump, Hotz, Imbens, and Mitnik (2009) to limit
comparisons to a trimmed sub-sample for which there is su¢ cient overlap in the propensity scores. The
results are very similiar, and are available from the author on request.
15households in the absence of the program, we track outcome changes of ineligible non-
clients between treatment and control villages. Our triple-di⁄erence matching estimate
is given by DD1-DD2 where DD1=change in outcome of eligible clients in the treatment
village minus change in outcome of eligible (non-clients) from the control village, and
DD2=change in outcome of ineligible non-clients from the treatment village minus change
in outcome of ineligible from the control village (all groups are matched ).16
4.2 Impact on ￿newcomers￿and ￿leavers￿
In this section, we consider heterogeneity in the treatment e⁄ect considering households￿
duration of participation in the program. This consideration is important since a MCI
may just attempt to enhance the short-term bene￿ts of its borrowers, and not focus
on long-term bene￿ts, perhaps to gain popularity and to expand its program. Therefore,
short-term program evaluation is likely to compromise the gains that accrue if the program
continues to provide microcredit over a long period. Thus, we examine whether households
who participate for longer periods bene￿t more compared with those participating for
shorter periods.17 The monitoring and follow-up of households over 8 years enables us
to examine the impacts that are likely to vary with the duration of participation. We
classify sample households into three broad categories:
1. continuing participants ￿clients of a MCI throughout 1997-2005;
2. non-participants ￿did not participate ever in any MCI program; and
3. occasional participants ￿clients in one or more years but not the entire period.
16The identi￿cation is also based on the SUTVA assumption. For our identi￿cation assumption to
hold, we require eligible participants not to share their loan with eligible non-participants from the non-
program villages. This is very unlikely given that there is now established literture which indicate that
risk sharing in developing countries does not take place beyond the village level. So, such spillover is
unlikely. Islam (2008), using the ￿rst cross-section data of this program, does not ￿nd any evidence in
support of spillover e⁄ects. If the programs have any positive (negative) e⁄ect on ineligible households
in later periods, then the impact estimates would be downward (upward) biased.
17When we observe small impacts in the ￿rst few years of follow-up and small impacts at the end,
we can be reasonably certain that extending the program to the control group would have yielded small
impacts. When we observe large impacts at the end of the eight-year follow-up, we can be fairly con￿dent
that extending the program to the control group would have yielded still larger impacts. In those cases
where impacts were large at the beginning and smaller at the end we have reason to speculate whether
an eight-year embargo would have increased treatment e⁄ects towards the end of the follow-up period.
16We divide the occasional participants into the following categories:
(i) New participants (newcomers1) ￿households who joined the program after the
1999, and remained as clients up to 2004-05;
(ii) More recent participants (newcomers2) ￿households who joined in the program
after 2001;
(iii) Long-term drop-outs (leavers1) ￿old clients who dropped out after 1998 and did
not participate any any MCI;
(iv) Medium-term drop-outs (leavers2) ￿clients who participated until 2001 and then
dropped out;
(v) Other ￿the residual category of the occasional clients.
We do not consider the last category as there are less than 50 observations in this
group. Of the 1,592 clients surveyed in our panel, 47.2 percent are continuing clients, 11.3
percent are long-term drop-outs, and 11 percent are medium-term drop-outs. There are
only 144 households who are newcomers1, and 76 who are newcomers2. 723 households
never participated in any round. The comparison group in the sample are (matched)
never participants who could potentially include (i) eligible households in control villages
(so they do not have access to any program); (ii) ineligible to participate in a program;
and (iii) eligible and staying in a program village but did not participate. The presence
of the last group means that there is potential selection bias since they choose not to
participate. We exclude them in our estimate. We also exclude ineligible clients.
We estimate the long-term treatment e⁄ect by comparing households who are contin-
uing clients (for at least 8 years) to those who could never participate in the program.
The entry into the program by some households at a later period possess a challenge to
evaluate the program because of concerns regarding the timing of the participation and
the consequent selection bias. Discussion with household members indicate that many
eligible households applied for the program later because they were initially unaware of
the availability of the microcredit program. There was also uncertainity over their eli-
gibility status, and the waiting period to obtain a microcredit loan. Also, the program
was not available in all villages at the same time. We estimate the treatment e⁄ects for
the new participants under the identifying assumption that those who joined later in the
program are systematically no di⁄erent, conditional on observables and time-invariant
17characteristics, from those who joined earlier. We can further relax this assumption using
the baseline information collected in 1997-98 for this group. For newcomers, the esti-
mated impacts are based on the changes in outcome before and after participation in the
program. The estimates obtained using newcomers2 are termed as ￿short-term e⁄ects,￿
while the corresponding estimates for newcomers1 are termed ￿medium-term e⁄ects,￿
considering their length of participation in microcredit.18
We consider leavers from the program separately to examine whether the impacts of
the program last beyond the period when the households left the program. It may be
argued that those who bene￿t most stay in the program while those who fail to gain
immediate bene￿ts drop out, or vice versa. Alexander-Tedeschi and Karlan (2009) argue
that the cross-sectional impact estimates will be biased if we exclude drop-outs from the
treatment group. Fortunately, with the availability of the panel dataset such concern
is not important in our case. We track drop-outs for up to 8 years post-program, and
compare leavers with those non-clients who would have dropped-out had they participated
in microcredit. Leavers1 left the program immediately after 1998 and did not participate
in any other program. We estimate the changes in outcome before and after the departure
from the program. Thus our estimates are not biased as they would have been under a
cross-sectional impact assessment. Results using a sample of leavers1 are referred to as the
long-run e⁄ect considering their length of the non-program status. Similarly, estimates
obtained using leavers2 are referred to as the medium-run e⁄ect. Using PSM helps us to
isolate the control households who would themselves drop out if they had been allowed
to participate. We argue that impacts occurring in subsequent years should add to the
accumulated impact amounts (impact estimates for continuing clients) to measure the
overall impact of participation in the program. Insofar as leavers from the program do
reap bene￿ts from their short-lived participation, these bene￿ts ought to be included in
the assessment of the value of any microcredit program. Therefore, the treatment e⁄ect
of microcredit is underestimated if we exclude the leavers since the total impact of a
program is equal to bene￿ts to continuing participants plus leavers.19
18The results for these two groups are based on their baseline characteristics as we could observe these
households before their participation in the program.
19The identifying assumption is that there is no dynamic sorting of households with high or low potential
outcomes participating early or late in the program. If there is a dynamic sorting, then the duration
of the participation in micro￿nance or decisions of when to leave or to participate in the program is
184.3 Results: Double- and Triple-Di⁄erence Estimates
Table 3 presents the results for continuing participants using the double and the triple-
di⁄erence matching approach.20 The lefthand side compares the changes in outcomes for
eligible clients in the program village (column 1) to the change for eligible households
(non-clients) in villages that do not have any program (column 2). Each cell in the
￿rst two columns contains the mean average outcome variables for these two groups. The
third column represents the di⁄erence between two groups at a given point in time, and its
standard error is reported in the fourth column. Panel B shows the di⁄erence in outcome
variables over time (8 years) for each group. Total food consumption increased by taka
736 in the client group, and by taka 601 in the control group. Thus there was a relative
increase of taka 134 in food consumption of eligible treated households in the program
village; this is the double-di⁄erence estimate of the impact of continuous participation
over 8 years in microcredit. This ￿gure represents a relative increase in food consumption
of 6.6 percent by continuing clients. Similar calculations show that non-food consumption
expenditure of clients increased by about 12.4 percent. The double-di⁄erence estimates
of self-employment income, and assets for the continuing participants are even higher,
representing increases of 28.1 and 14.8 percent, respectively. The results show that there
is very little or no impact on ￿other income.￿
However, if there was a distinct shock to the treatment villages over this period or
if a MCI selects a village observing certain shocks in that village then double-di⁄erence
estimate does not correctly identify the impact of the treatment. We examine this in the
righthand side of Table 3, where we perform the same exercise for ineligible groups who
did not receive any treatment (Columns 5 and 6, respectively). These households are
una⁄ected by the microcredit program, and we use them to di⁄erence away any relative
likely to depend on the unobserved potential outcomes perceived by households but not by researchers.
In cross-sectional data, the di⁄erence between groups is important and may invalidate the results. Our
results do not su⁄er from such problems since we are di⁄erencing out any di⁄erences that could exist in
terms of outcome variables. We also ￿nd, using the ￿rst round of this dataset, no signi￿cant di⁄erences
between eligible households in treatment and control groups in terms of either outcome or observable
characteristics (results not reported but are available upon request).
20The reported results are based on the ￿rst and last rounds of the survey. We use these two rounds
because there was a ￿ ood at the end of 1998 in Bangladesh, and many of the outcome variables could
be disproportionately a⁄ected by post-￿ ood rehabilitation programs, and damage from ￿ oods. Although
the 1999-2000 survey took place more than one year after the ￿ ood, a shock of that magnitude is likely
to have impact in the following year or so on household behaviour and outcomes.
19trend in the treated and control groups correlated with unobservables, but not due to the
program. We ￿nd a slight decrease in food consumption and large reduction in assets,
little increase in non-food consumption, but a signi￿cant increase in income and self-
employment income among ineligible households in the treatment village compared to
the control village.
Taking the di⁄erence between the two sides of Table 3 (Panel C, columns 1 and 5),
there is a 7 percent and 11.7 percent gain in food and non-food consumption, respectively,
for continuing participants. The gain in self-employment income is 15.1 percent, and while
￿other income￿is increased by 6.5 percent. The gains in terms of accumulating assets is
14.8 percent (DD estimate) and 41.3 percent (DDD estimate). Thus, if the DDD strategy
is taken to be more suitable than the DD strategy in separating out the treatment e⁄ect
of microcredit, impact estimates are overstated for long-term clients in the case of self-
employment income and non-food consumption, but understated in the case of income,
food consumption and assets using the double-di⁄erence method.21
The medium and short-term treatment e⁄ects are reported in Table 4. They are repre-
sented by the triple-di⁄erence estimates for newcomers1 and newcomers2. The estimates
for the newcomers are obtained using the baseline and post-program outcome in 2004-
05. The results show that newcomers2 enjoy a large increase in food consumption, while
newcomers1 experience a moderate fall in food consumption. Combining food and non-
food expenditure we observe an increase of expenditure for newcomers2 while a decline in
expenditure for newcomers1. The estimated impact for newcomers1 indicates a smaller
positive e⁄ect on self-employment income and other income, and a large increase of non-
land assets. newcomers2 also gain more self-employment income and other income. The
exception is assets, where we ￿nd a large decline. While it is not obvious why consumption
of newcomers1 are declining while their income is increasing, the results from Kaboski
and Townsend (2005) and Banerjee et al. (2009) suggest that such an outcome is not
unusual. The di⁄erential results between medium-term and long-term impacts may be
21The reported standard errors are larger and this is partly due to non-parametric matching estimates,
and partly due to the smallness of the sample in each category. See Angrist (1998) and Zhao (2006)
who compare the performance of matching and regression methods and ￿nd the former estimators have
larger standard errors. In fact, we will see in the next section that a regression method of our approach
that includes controls gives a tighter con￿dence interval, and so the coe¢ cents become statistically more
signi￿cant.
20attributable to the additional gains resulting from longer participation or larger amounts
of credit being borrowed from the MCI. The overall results of newcomers indicate that the
gains are lower than the continuing clients. In fact, we obtain some results which show a
very insigni￿cant (or sometimes negative) impact for newcomers. But, these results are
not statistically signi￿cant at the conventional level. The results do, however, indicate
that if one examines microcredit households using short-term program participation data,
the impact estimates could be biased.22
Table 5 gives the triple-di⁄erence estimates for leavers. The lefthand side shows the
results of leavers1 while the righthand side reports the corresponding results for leavers2.
The results indicate that the impact estimates are positive for all outcome measures
except for food consumption. The results indirectly indicate that drop-outs leave the
program not because they are unsuccessful. Only about 5 percent reported that they
dropped out because of di¢ culty in repaying their loan. About 60 percent of households
mentioned the frequency of loan repayment and the necessity to attend a weekly meeting
as the major reason of dropping out. The descriptive statistics (unreported here) show no
signi￿cant di⁄erence between leavers and continuing clients in terms of other observable
(demographic) variables. It is likely that there are some unobserved factors that might
predict why these households dropped out. They could include, for example, pressure
from husband/family not to attend the meeting, impatience with following the procedure
of getting and paying the loan, busy with other activities such as taking care of children
or parents, and so on. Causal observations and discussion with borrowers indicate these
factors in￿ uence their decision to leave the program. However, the results indicate that
households can achieve a substantial gain if they are patient and can wait a few years to
obtain a larger loan. The potential for gains are larger than simply leaving the program
as can be seen when comparing the results of stayers and leavers. In table 5, when we
compare two groups of leavers the resulting impacts are very similar for these two groups
except for assets. Leavers2 (more recent drop-outs) still have a sizeable increase in assets
than their older counterpart, leavers1. Comparing leavers1 with leavers2 we ￿nd that
the increase in the size of treated-untreated di⁄erentials are decaying. This also implies
that the size of the e⁄ects, beyond the years during which households were participants,
22These results are based on a smaller sample size.
21is diminishing.
We also estimate the treatment e⁄ects using a triple-di⁄erence approach proposed
by Ravallion, Galasso, Lazo and Philipp (2005). According to this approach, we need
to compare changes in outcomes of continuing participants and matched leavers, after
netting out the outcome changes for a matched comparison group that never partici-
pated. The estimation method requires the following steps: (1) calculate the (propensity
score weighted) outcome di⁄erence between continuing participants and matched non-
participants; (2) calculate the outcome di⁄erence between leavers from the program and
matched non-participants; (3) take the di⁄erence of each of (1) and (2) at two points of
observation; and (4) take the double di⁄erences calculated in (3). In essence, this re-
quires the subtraction of the double-di⁄erence estimates of continuing clients (Table 3)
from the double-di⁄erence estimate of leavers1 (Table 5). The resulting impact estimates
are positive in all cases as shown in Table 6. When compared to estimates obtained for
continuing participants in Table 3, we ￿nd impacts that are larger in the case of food
consumption and slightly smaller for all other outcome variables (see last column, Table
6). Since drop-outs from microcredit are expected to receive partial treatment (e.g., due
to the continuing return from an old investment project, or training received from an
MCI) which could increase their income/assets, these triple-di⁄erence estimates are likely
to be understated. However, it also gives estimates of what drop-outs could have gained
had they not left the program.
4.4 Triple-Di⁄erence in Regression Framework
In order to increase the precision of triple-di⁄erence estimates we use a regression frame-
work. By adding controls, we hope to net out the in￿ uence of factors such as household
age, gender, education and family composition, etc., that may have in￿ uenced the in-
come, consumption and assets over the study period. We run the following reduced-form
regression:
Yit = ￿i + ￿Xit + ￿1￿t + ￿2villeli + ￿3(villeli ￿ ￿t) ￿ +￿4Di + ￿5(Di ￿ villeli)
+￿6(Di ￿ ￿t) + ￿7(Di ￿ villeli ￿ ￿t) + "it (4)
where Yit is the logarithm of outcome variables (except the self-employment income),
22and X is a vector of control variables. villeli is a dummy variable (=1 if eligible and
staying in program village, 0 otherwise), ￿t is the ￿xed year e⁄ect which controls for
macroeconomic changes, Di is the treatment variable. Here, ￿rst we consider the continu-
ing participants as the treatment group, and exclude occasional members of microcredit.
In equation (4), ￿3 controls for changes that happened for eligible households in the
treatment village over time versus ineligible households, ￿5 captures the secular di⁄er-
ences between eligible and ineligible households in the treated group, ￿6 captures changes
over time of the treatment group. The third level of interaction coe¢ cient ￿7 captures
all variations in outcomes speci￿c to the treatment group (relative to the non-treated
group) in the program village (relative to the control village) in 2004-05 (relative to 1997-
98). This is the DDD estimate of the impact of microcredit program on (continuing)
participants.
We present results for both the matched sample and the full sample in Table 7 using
equation (4). The estimated treatment e⁄ects for continuing participants are shown in
columns (1) and (2). The results indicate that households can increase food consumption,
income, self-employment income, and assets. However, the resulting estimate is negative
for non-food consumption. The results are similar using both the matched sample and the
full sample of continuing clients. In columns (3) and (4), we report results of the treatment
e⁄ects using all participants, including occasional participants. It was computationally
cumbersome to estimate separate regression for each type of participant (leavers, new-
comers). Thus, we include all categories of clients. The results in Table 7 show that
households￿participation in a microcredit program can increase self-employment income
by 60-70 percent, and assets by 40-50 percent. Regression adjustment increases the magni-
tude of the estimated coe¢ cients, and reduces the standard errors of coe¢ cient estimates.
This suggests that there is a negative correlation between household socio-economic status
and the participation/microcredit demand. These results are still lower than McKernan
(2002) who ￿nds that households more than double their self-employment earnings (126
percent increase in self-employment pro￿ts) by participating with the Grameen Bank.23
de Mel, McKenzie and Woodru⁄ (2008, 2009) ￿nd similar results in terms of the returns
23Our results are not directly comparable with Pitt and Khandker (1998), McKernan (2002), Khandker
(2005) since we are using a di⁄erent dataset in terms of the MCIs and households, as well as di⁄erent
time periods.
23from microenterprise owned by men in Sri Lanka. The results on self-employment income
are qualitatively similar to our earlier estimates for continuing clients. The estimated
treatment e⁄ects are larger using continuing clients, indicating that the treatment e⁄ect
of microcredit is higher for continuing participation than occasional participants.
5 Conclusion
This research utilizes a new and signi￿cantly extended database for Bangladesh to ex-
amine the impact of microcredit programs. An important contribution of this paper is
the investigation of the sensitivity of the impact estimates with respect to the length
of participation in microcredit programs, and the quanti￿cation of any ongoing e⁄ects
subsequent to the departure from the program. To this end, a clear distinction is drawn
between short-, medium- and long-term e⁄ects to re￿ ect the length of participation in the
program and to capture the post-program consequences of microcredit lending.
The ￿ndings of the study enable us to draw several conclusions about medium-term
and long-term impacts of microcredit lending schemes in Bangladesh. The results show
that continuing participants gain in all outcome measures, and the treated-untreated
di⁄erentials are larger for these households. This signi￿es that long-term participation
in microcredit can help households proportionately more than short-term participation.
There is also su¢ cient evidence that the gains accrue beyond the participation period.
The estimated treatment e⁄ects are lower when we include drop-outs in the treatment
groups. Although we are uncertain about the precise magnitude of impacts over the long
run, the results indicate that the bene￿ts may not accrue inde￿nitely following withdrawal
from the program.
The main conclusion of this study is that the graduation from poverty using microcre-
dit in Bangladesh requires longer-term participation. It takes time for household entrepre-
neurs to achieve productive e¢ ciency or to generate higher returns from self-employment
activities. Since existing members of microcredit obtain larger loans by participating in
a program over a longer-term, our results indirectly point out that MCIs may provide
larger loans sooner rather than later. This is an argument also put forward by Ahlin and
Jiang (2008). Our results suggest that conventional program evaluations that are based
on the outcomes reported by continuing participants may underestimate the contribution
24of microcredit programs. The results also imply that using short-term treatment data in
a microcredit program may not provide a reliable estimate of the overall impact of the
program.
The results for leavers and newcomers are, however, subject to the small sample prob-
lem. The results are therefore only indicative, and more research will be needed to draw
more de￿nite conclusions. In this study we aim to tackle an important and largely ig-
nored question in development economics, which is the impact of medium and long-term
participation in a microcredit program. The results in this paper are based on large, rep-
resentative, mainstream MCIs from Bangladesh. It would also be important to examine
whether these ￿ndings hold true in other countries with similar programs. Hopefully, this
paper will generate more debate on this issue and will encourage further research on the
impact of di⁄erent lengths of participation in microcredit.
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28Appendix:
Variables used in the estimation of propensity score:
Household Level variables: Age of household head, Square of the age of household head,
Sex of household head, Marital status of household head, Education level of household
head and spouse (illiterate, can sign only, can read only, can read and write), Whether
household head has spouse, Highest grade achieved by a member in the household, total
arable land owned by household, Number of children age below 6 years, age 6-15, Depen-
dency ratio, Number of 15-60 years old male and female member, Type of family (joint
family or semi-nuclear, nuclear ), Dummies for occupation of the household head (farmer,
agricultural labour, non-agricultural labour, self-employed or businessman, professional or
salaried job holder, any other job), Electricity connection, Number of living room (beside
bathroom/kitchen), If cement or brick used in any of the living room, Whether condition
of house is good, liveable, or dirty, Whether household has separate kitchen, toilet facility.
Village level Variable: Presence or absence of primary school, secondary school or
college, health facility, Adult male wage in the village, presence of brick-built road, regular
market, post o¢ ce, local government o¢ ce, youth organization, Distance to nearest thana,
Number of money lenders, large farmers/traders who provides advances against crops in
the village, Number of small credit/savings groups in the village, Price of Rice, wheat,
oil, potato.
29Table 1: Descriptive statistics
1997-1998 1999-2000 2004-05
Demographic Variables Treat Control Diff Treat Control Diff Treat Control Diff
Age of the Head 44.01 45.24 -1.23 46.26 47.52 -1.26 47.62 47.87 -0.25
# of working people 2.8 2.81 -0.01 2.98 3.06 -0.08 3.63 3.56 0.07
Household size 5.71 5.5 0.21 6.09 6.03 0.06 7.23 7.23 0
Max education by any
member 5.29 5.75 -0.46 5.92 6.64 -0.72 7.08 7.43 -0.35
Area of arable land 57.72 84.01 -26.29 64.92 101.72 -36.8 54.55 91 -36.45
# of children 2.93 2.69 0.24 2.32 2.1 0.22 3 3.02 -0.02
# of women 2.72 2.57 0.15 2.99 2.88 0.11 3.32 3.2 0.12
# of old people 0.21 0.3 -0.09 0.35 0.44 -0.09 0.28 0.33 -0.05
# of married people 2.4 2.37 0.03 2.72 2.68 0.04 3.2 3.11 0.09
If women is head 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.13 -0.04
Outcome Variable (in
taka)
Food Cons. (M) 2419.2 2452.4 -33.2 2833.7 3101.9 -268.2 3232.6 3197.8 34.8
Non-Food exp (M) 688.4 998.6 -310.2 507.5 674.2 -166.7 821.8 1114.1 -292.3
Non-land total Asset 17787.7 23153.7 -5366 21575.1 23866.4 -2291 17906.4 25605.8 -7699
Other Income (M) 34263.1 31114.4 3148.7 31708.9 41044.4 -9336 38457.9 51403.2 -12945
Self-emp. income (M) 6703.7 5007.3 1696.4 8312.6 1507.6 6805 11659 2378.8 9280.2
Amount of credit 7427.3 10616.8 11682.5
# of clients 1592 1532 1280
# of obs. 2694 2694 2694
Note: Difference that are statistically significant at 5 percent level are in bold.
Exchange rate between taka and US$ in 1998 was 40/$
30Table 2: Impact Estimates using Fixed E⁄ects and Random Growth Models










Food cons. exp 0.0168 0.0184 0.0129 0.0047
(0.0069) (0.0094) (0.0202) (0.0263)
Non-food cons. exp 0.1172 0.0304 0.0458 0.0434
(0.0121) (0.0082) (0.0177) (0.0191)
Other income -0.0094 -0.0077 0.0504 0.065
(0.0064) (0.0087) (0.0194) (0.0234)
Self- emp. Income
1 0.0977 0.147 0.1284 0.3166
(0.0239) (0.0291) (0.0658) (0.0777)
(Non-Land) Asset 0.0462 0.0485 0.03884 0.0486
(0.0084) (0.0109) (0.01421) (0.0159)
Notes:
The regressions include household demographic and socio-economic variables as controls. Standard errors presented in parenthesis are
corrected for clustering at the village and year level. The matched sample is based on the propensity score estimated using first cross-section
data using a wider set of household and village level variables.
1 Estimated coefficient is based on random effect tobit model since fixed effects tobit are biased and inconsistent
31Table 3: DDD Estimates of the impact of Micro￿nance on Continuing Participants





















1997/98                    (A) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Food Consumption 2047.6 1982.0 65.6 97.0 2632.8 2578.6 54.3 200.9
Non-food Consumption 478.3 610.7 -132.5 69.2 1248.1 927.4 320.7 241.5
Other Income 2731.8 3122.7 -390.9 201.6 3709.2 2812.5 896.7 403.5
self-employment income 912.4 856.7 55.7 144.0 171.2 469.6 -298.4 195.9
Asset 14442.7 18146.9 -3704.2 2231.2 38396.2 26016.5 12379.7 5083.1
2004/05
Food Consumption 2783.6 2583.7 199.9 136.1 3336.0 3290.6 45.4 283.5
Non-food Consumption 638.2 711.2 -73.1 76.8 1454.1 1129.9 324.3 273.8
Income 3286.7 3674.8 932.5 419.7 7095.0 6374.2 720.8 814.0
self-employment income 963.1 651.1 312.0 164.2 135.2 315.1 -179.9 253.6
Asset 14645.5 16209.9 -1564.4 2113.3 42049.8 33494.6 8555.3 6732.0
Time Difference (B)
Food Consumption 736.0 601.7 703.2 712.0
Non-food Consumption 159.9 100.5 206.0 202.5
Other Income 554.9 552.1 3385.8 3561.7
self-employment income 50.7 -205.6 -36.0 -154.5
Asset 202.8 -1937.0 3653.7 7478.1
Double Difference (C) s.e %Gain s.e
Food Consumption 134.3 167.1 6.6 -8.8 347.4
Non-food Consumption 59.4 103.4 12.4 3.5 365.2
Other Income 2.8 465.6 0.1 -175.9 908.5
self-employment income 256.3 218.4 28.1 118.5 320.4
Asset 2139.9 3073.1 14.8 -3824.4 8435.5
Triple Difference (D) s.e %Gain
Food Consumption 143.2 385.5 7.0
Non-food Consumption 55.9 379.5 11.7
Other Income 178.7 1020.9 6.5
self-employment income 137.8 387.8 15.1
Asset 5964.3 8977.9 41.3
Notes: Matching without replacement, caliper <.0005 (.005 for ineligible group). Observations with too highor too low
values are omitted in the final estimation. The sample size change slightly depending on the number of match available in
each case.
32Table 4: DDD Matching Estimates of the impact of Micro￿nance on "Newcomers"
Medium-term participation Impact (Newcomers1)

















difference 1997/98 2004/05 1997/98 2004/05
Food
Consumption
-162.38 -239.99 -77.61 -68.77 -332.14 -13.51 318.63 327.47
(125.36) (120.99) (174.22) (388.64) (179.95) (240.47) (300.34) (459.23)
Non-food
consumption
-100.02 -101.73 -1.71 -5.24 -90.86 -164.49 -73.63 -77.15
(101.39) (81.40) (130.02) (387.61) (89.58) (100.72) (134.79) (389.24)
Other
Income
-656.92 -730.75 -73.83 102.1 -156.84 -120.64 36.19 212.13
(270.56) (424.90) (503.73) (1038.82) (326.45) (391.95) (510.09) (1041.92)
Self- Empl.
Income
-3.91 127.82 131.73 13.25 427.84 647.71 219.88 101.4
(163.41) (145.56) (218.84) (388.04) (240.51) (390.42) (458.56) (559.43)
Asset -6244.59 -5962.75 281.84 4106.28 1576.83 -4048.3 -5625.12 -1800.68
(3129.44) (2682.04) (4121.50) (9388.52) (3476.51) (2572.95) (4325.07) (9479.66)
Notes:
1households who joined the program after the 1999, and remained as clients up to 2004-05.
2households who joined in the
program after 2001.
Double difference (treatment group) is obtained by subtracting column (2) from column (1). Triple difference is obtained
using ineligible households in program and control villages.  Matching is done without replacement using caliper <.0005
(.005 for ineligible group because of smaller sample size). Observations with too high or too low values are omitted in the
final estimation. The sample size changes slightly depending on the number of match available in each case.
33Table 5: DDD Matching Estimates of the impact of Micro￿nance on "Leavers"
Long-run effects of participation (leavers1)

















difference 1997/98 2004/05 1997/98 2004/05
Food
Consumption
124.09 -90.11 -214.21 -205.3 101.65 -71.97 -173.62 -164.78
(135.80) (197.06) (239.32) (421.8) (99.87) (139.25) (171.36) (387.36)
Non-food
consumption
10.53 62.93 52.4 48.88 -40.37 11.02 51.39 47.87
(121.72) (144.68) (189.07) (411.2) (77.08) (92.57) (120.46) (384.51)
Other
Income
232.07 161.7121 -70.36 105.57 -25.34 237.1092 262.45 157.27
(321.10) (506.46) (599.67) (1088.5) (217.11) (341.49) (404.67) (994.57)
Self- Empl.
Income
-158.23 38.94 197.18 78.7 -23.61 115.96 139.57 21.08
(152.77) (275.79) (315.27) (449.5) (156.18) (188.67) (244.92) (403.33)
Asset -442.08 -661.73 -219.64 3604.8 -3866.56 -663.87 3202.69 7027.13
(3373.77) (3014.01) (4524.00) (9572.0) (2664.35) (2371.47) (3566.88) (9158.62)
Notes:
1Old clients who dropped out after 1998 and did not participate any any MFI;
2 Clients who participated until 2001 and then dropped out.
The sample size changes slightly depending on the number of match available in each case.Triple difference is obtained
using ineligible households in program and control villages.  Matching is done without replacement using caliper <.0005
(.005 for ineligible group because of smaller sample size). Observations with too high or too low values are omitted in the
final estimation. The sample size changes slightly depending on the number of match available in each case.
Table 6: DDD Matching Impact estimates: Stayers versus leavers
Table 6: DDD estimates of program participation: Stayers versus
leavers
DD regular DD leaver DDD (Ravallion) DDD
Food Consumption 134.32 -214.21 348.52 143.16
(167.09) (239.32) (386.51) (385.49)
Non-food consumption 59.4 52.4 7.0 55.88
(103.38) (189.07) (103.62) (379.50)
Other Income 1323.33 -70.36 1393.69 1499.26
(465.62) (599.67) (1469.41) (1020.89)
Self- Employment Income 256.27 197.18 59.09 137.79
(218.42) (315.27) (226.27) (387.81)
Asset 2139.85 -219.64 2359.5 5964.29
(3073.13) (4524.00) (3874.45) (8977.85)
Notes:
DDD (Ravallion) are estimated following Ravallion et al. (2005) and is derived by subtracting column
(1) from column (2). The last column labelled as DDD is taken from previous estimates to compare
results with column (3)
34Table 7: Regression Adjusted DDD Impact estimates










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Food Consumption 0.0888 0.0666 0.0604 0.0688
(0.0636) (0.0752) (0.0554) (0.0666)
Non-food Consumption -0.1513 -0.0228 -0.2514 -0.1266
(0.0929) (0.1038) (0.0940) (0.0903)
Other Income 0.0306 0.0316 0.057 0.0313
(0.0961) (0.1043) (0.0831) (0.0888)
Self-employment income 0.8257 0.7081 0.6960 0.6070
(0.2622) (0.2651) (0.2420) (0.2490)
Asset 0.5341 0.4852 0.4029 0.3846
(0.2221) (0.2201) (0.1775) (0.1765)
N=1470 N=1397 N=2694 N=1874
Notes: Standard errors presented in parenthesis are corrected for clustering at the village and year level. The
matched sample is based on the propensity score estimated from first cross -section data. A household is chosen in
the matched sample if its propensity score lies within the probability distance of 0.0005
Table 8: Descriptive statistics by Participation status of Attritors (1997/98)
Variables Treatment Control Difference p-value
Age of household head 43.02 44.59 -1.57 0.3
Number of adult working people in the household 2.52 2.54 -0.02 0.9
Household size 5.28 5.15 0.13 0.62
Highest Grade/class passed by any family member 5.05 5.55 -0.5 0.29
Total arable land owned by household 65.79 60.02 5.78 0.78
Number of children aged 0-15 in the household 2.67 2.59 0.08 0.66
Number of female member in the household 2.64 2.48 0.17 0.28
Number of old people of age above 60 yrs 0.25 0.25 -0.01 0.91
Whether women is the head of the household 0.06 0.11 -0.05 0.12
Number of married people in the household 2.24 2.33 -0.09 0.32
Average age of all member in the household 24.43 25.33 -0.9 0.41























kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0397
Figure-1: Estimated Odds Ratio for Treatment and Comparison Groups
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